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Abstract 
The Environmental Protection Agency released its proposed Clean Power Regulation in June 2014, 
and in mid-summer 2015, the finalized rule will be the first comprehensive regulation of carbon 
dioxide emissions from existing power plants in American history. Compliance strategies will be 
expensive and complex decisions for states to make. Each state faces the choice of whether to 
comply individually or as a region, but posses the freedom to comply in whatever way they choose. 
Pennsylvania is unique. The commonwealth has an entrenched coal industry, a nascent natural gas 
industry, and is a net exporter of electricity. Joining the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
a group of northeast states that borders Pennsylvania to the north, may be one compliance option, 
but joining a different region may be a more desirable lower cost solution. This analysis seeks to 
show that the cost of compliance would be lower if Pennsylvania joined a select group of states 
within the PJM Interconnection. One result of the analysis suggests that by joining with 
complementary states within PJM, relatively minor changes in Pennsylvania coal-fired generation 
would be required to meet Clean Power Plan compliance 2030 goals. 
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 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an organization set up by the United 
Nations to synthesize all research available around the world regarding climate change and present 
that data to policymakers reports, “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 
1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia.”1 The body 
begins its summary report for policymakers by saying,  
The atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide have 
increased to levels unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Carbon dioxide 
concentrations have increased by 40% since pre-industrial times, primarily from 
fossil fuel emissions and secondarily from net land use change emissions. The ocean 
has absorbed about 30% of the emitted anthropogenic carbon dioxide, causing ocean 
acidification.2 
Numerous compounds comprise greenhouse gases, but a key gas is carbon dioxide.3 Additionally, 
one of the key sources of emissions of carbon dioxide worldwide are electrical power plants, as the 
electricity sector accounted for 32% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2012.4 Accordingly, the 
need for reductions in the carbon dioxide emissions of power plants is clear. In the United States, 
however, there are no regulations surrounding the emission of CO2 by power plants, as there are for 
other pollutants.5 This situation comes about as a result of the failure of multiple pieces of legislation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 IPCC, 2013: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of 
Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2. 
2 Ibid. 9. 
3 IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 132. 
4 Environmental Protection Agency. Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2012, 2-21. 
5 The Clean Air Act was initially passed in 1963, with major amendments in 1970, 1977, and 1990. It maintains National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), created a market-based system for acid rain management; required Title V 
permits for major emissions sources, among other provisions (See Belden, Roy). A related rule is the new Cross-State 
Air Pollution Rule, which limits nitrous oxide (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from upwind states in order to 
help downwind states meet NAAQS. The EPA has not previously regulated the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions of 
major sources like electrical power plants.	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that sought to regulate CO2 emissions in the United States, most prominently with a national cap-
and-trade program that stalled in Congress.6  
In order to bring about regulation of power plant carbon dioxide emissions without the 
passage of a law in Congress, President Obama ordered the EPA to use its authority under Section 
111(b) and Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon pollution from new and existing 
power plants, respectively.7 This report focuses on the EPA’s regulation under Section 111(d), 
regulation of existing power plants. The EPA released its proposed Clean Power Plan in June 2014, 
along with troves of data from modeling work, and received public comments on the Plan through 
December 2014. In June 2015, the EPA will issue final rules on existing power plant carbon 
pollution, and under the proposed rule, states will need to submit either an individual state 
compliance plan or a request for an extension (if it intends to comply as part of a regional effort) of 
one or two years.8 Pennsylvania emitted 105,184,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide from its electrical 
power generation sector in 2012, and has been one of the more polluting states in the country in 
recent years.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Bill) (H.R. 2454) would have created a 
national cap-and-trade program, along with other provisions. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) determined that 
the bill would have reduced the federal budget deficit by $24 billion between 2010-2019 (See Congressional Budget 
Office). The Act passed the House of Representatives on a 219-212 vote in 2009 (Open Congress), but was not voted 
on by the Senate. 
7 Obama, Presidential Memorandum: Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards. Section 1(b). 
8 Environmental Protection Agency. Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule.  
9 Environmental Protection Agency. Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule. Data File: Rate to Mass Translation.	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Source: EPA Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, Data File: Rate to Mass Translation. 
As Figure 1 makes clear, any regulation of carbon dioxide will have a significant impact upon 
Pennsylvania. The commonwealth faces a major challenge in responding to this regulation, as there 
are many factors involved and the way forward is not clear. The aim of this paper is to evaluate 
multiple options for compliance in Pennsylvania, among them joining the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), forming a comparable cap-and-trade program with other states, and complying as 
an individual state. Uncertainty abounds, and the decision is major, with billions of dollars at stake.10 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The EPA Clean Power Plan has a compliance period of 2017-2029, giving it a reach over a decade in length. The 
reserve price of an allowance for one ton of CO2 in the RGGI program is $2.00, with one allowance being equal to one 
ton of carbon, and over one hundred million tons of CO2 currently being emitted per year in Pennsylvania, that price 
could very well increase, and even were it to not, compliance will involve billions of dollars of value at stake. 
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Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a regional cap-and-trade program set up 
by a group of northeastern states’ governors in 2005. The original member states were Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont; the states’ governors 
signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which set out a model rule for state legislatures 
to pass.11 In 2006, Massachusetts and Rhode Island signed the MOU and joined RGGI. In 2011 
New Jersey left the organization, bringing current membership to eight northeastern states.12 RGGI 
is a voluntary organization, in the sense that the states involved created and joined the program of 
their own volition in the absence of any federal requirement. While membership is voluntary, when a 
state joins RGGI, compliance with the cap via the lowering of emissions or purchasing of 
allowances is mandatory for all qualifying generators in the state. 
 RGGI is a cap-and-trade program. This form of emissions regulation is nothing new to 
environmental regulation, with emissions trading being modeled for economic efficiency at least as 
far back as 1967.13 In essence, a cap-and-trade program works by setting a “cap,” meaning a 
maximum amount of allowable emissions of a certain type, in this case the maximum number of 
tons of carbon dioxide, which can be permissibly emitted in the regulated area. The “trade” aspect is 
that allowances are then created equal to the cap amount of emissions, and these allowances can be 
traded among qualifying actors in the marketplace. At the end of a compliance period, every 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The Memorandum of Understanding, subsequent amendments, and the Model Rule are available on RGGI.org. The 
MOU established the program, as originally Connecticut, Delaware, Main, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and 
Vermont formed the program. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland would later join, and New Jersey later exit. 
The MOU specifies the total cap as a summary of individual state caps. There is a single regional auction for allowances, 
and revenues are distributed according to state caps. 
12 Massachusetts and Rhode Island had caps determined in the original MOU, and there was an Amendment to the 
MOU for Maryland’s entrance to RGGI, specifying its cap. For entrance into RGGI, a state’s governor supports it, and 
the state legislature will pass a rule, based on the Model Rule, which has sufficient flexibility for states to make such 
changes as the percentage of allowances that will be sold at auction. 
13 A major analysis using the concept was: Burton and Sanjour, An Economic Analysis of the Control of Sulphur Oxides Air 
Pollution, 1967. 
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emissions source covered by the regulation must demonstrate possession of allowances equal to 
their emissions during the period. In other words, one allowance allows the holder to emit one ton 
of carbon dioxide. At the end of the year, if a power plant has emitted one thousand tons of carbon 
dioxide, it must have one thousand allowances in its account, or face severe penalty.14 Each year, the 
cap declines by a set amount, so that over time there are fewer and fewer allowances available, and 
emissions in the covered area must correspondingly decline.15 The trade aspect of these programs 
allows for significantly improved efficiency relative to “command-and-control” type regulations, 
because trading leads to emissions being reduced in order of cost, as the cheapest reductions are 
achieved first, then the next cheapest, and so on. The cost of reducing emissions sets the market 
price of allowances, and the declining level of the cap ensures that the rising cost of allowances 
gradually incentivizes increasingly expensive emissions reductions.16 
 Cap-and-trade programs have numerous differences in the specifics of their operation.17 One 
important difference is the manner in which the allowances are distributed to power plants (or any 
regulated body) within a program. The European Union has a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade 
program, for example, and operates it by distributing allowances to plants based upon historical 
emissions, and then allowing trade among these actors.18 Research suggests that this choice was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 An example of a penalty is that RGGI requires non-compliant units to have three times allowances for emissions for a 
period of years after the infraction. 
15 In RGGI, the MOU sets out an original cap, set to remain unchanged 2009-2014, with 2.5% decline in the cap in each 
year 2015-2020. The 2012 Program Review concluded that the original cap was too high, and modified it downward by 
approximately 45% for 2014, keeping the same 2.5% decline per year for 2015-2020. 
16 A cap-and-trade program, like other market-based emissions reductions schemes, gains efficiency over command-and-
control type regulation because its price signal sets the price for emissions by the marginal reduction (thereby removing 
problems of over- or underpriced emissions) and that price signal allows the least expensive emissions reductions to be 
made until the necessary overall reduction is achieved. A review of various types of market-based emissions reductions 
programs, and evidence for their success particularly in combating air pollution, is found in: Stavins, Experience with 
Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments, 2003. 
17 There can be many different specific differences. Some key differences are in the process of allowance allocation, 
specifically whether all or part of those allocations will be auctioned off. Other points include who is allowed to 
participate in the auction, which economic actors are required to comply, how long the cap will decline for, and at what 
rate the decline will take place. 
18 Huber, How Did RGGI Do It? Political Economy and Emissions Auctions, 73. 
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primarily driven by political factors.19 The example of RGGI is important here. An important feature 
of RGGI is that nearly all allowances are sold at an auction by the states. Each member state has a 
portion of the cap allocated to them, and that state’s legislature can decide how to allocate that 
portion of the cap. In RGGI, all states decided to auction nearly all the allowances off. Allocation of 
allowances based on historical emissions, called “grandfathering,” can cause issues such as market 
bias for incumbents relative to new entrants, windfall profits for existing emitters, slowed emissions 
reductions due to barriers to market entry, and political manipulation of the market in the allocation 
system.20 An auction can help ameliorate all of these issues, raising market efficiency and program 
efficacy. RGGI has been a success since its inception, raising nearly $2 billion in auction revenue for 
states’ use through 2014 and helping to significantly reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the area.21 
RGGI faces challenges to become a compliance mechanism for the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)’s Clean Power Plan, as certain modifications will be required to become a qualifying 
regional implementation plan for its participating states. 22 23 
 Pennsylvania has held non-participant observer status in RGGI since its inception.24 RGGI 
has previously been examined as a possible mechanism by which the commonwealth could comply 
with the upcoming EPA Clean Power Plan regulations.25 Studies to date have cited potential issues, 
such as the difference between Pennsylvania, a net-exporter of electricity, a major coal-fired power 
plant state with a significant coal mining industry, and the RGGI states, which tend to be net 
importers of electricity without large amounts of either coal mining or coal-fired generation.26 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 80-83. 
20 Ibid., 71-77. 
21 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 1. 
22 Ramseur, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Lessons Learned and Issues for Policy Makers, 2. This report mentions that the 
RGGI program’s covered entities only emit about 20% of all GHG emissions in the states. 
23 Ibid., 16. This would include the cost containment measures as well as the program timeframe. 
24 Bernstein, Montgomery, and Tuladhar, Economic Consequences of Northeastern States Proposals to Limit Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from the Electricity Sector, 2.	  
25 Smokelin and Demase, Is RGGI in Pennsylvania’s Future? 
26 Silverman, McCarthy, and Day, EPA Power Plan Rule Raises Questions About Expansion of RGGI Participant States, 2. 
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paper will attempt a more in-depth analysis of how Pennsylvania’s joining RGGI might look and the 
effects thereof. 
 Imagining how Pennsylvania might join RGGI and the costs of doing so is complicated by 
the difficulties in knowing exactly how joining the group would look. For example, it is hard to 
determine Pennsylvania’s cap for its first year. RGGI calculated its original cap by choosing the base 
year of 1990, though they had to calculate estimate emissions from the year, since emissions data is 
not available for carbon dioxide prior to 1995.27 The state allocations of that cap were determined in 
a yet more complex process.28 In addition, RGGI conducted a review in 2012 and decided to reduce 
the size of its cap significantly for 2014.29 All of these factors make deciding on a cap for 
Pennsylvania, should it join RGGI, quite difficult. Studies on Pennsylvania joining RGGI for the 
Clean Power Plan do not exist, most likely because the final form of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan 
regulation will not be released until summer 2015.30  Challenges will continue after a cap has been 
calculated, as it will be difficult to predict how even the electrical power industry will be affected by 
such broad regulation, let alone numerous other, related industries. RGGI and the EPA use 
extremely complex, and correspondingly expensive, linear programming models, refined over years, 
in order to model just the electric power industry under various scenarios.31 Absent the resources to 
build a linear programming model from scratch to model broader costs in addition to electric power 
industry, and absent the resources to purchase results from a firm’s model, this paper will attempt to 
use released model outputs and various techniques with that data to make a best analysis of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Recommendation on Setting a Base Year, 1. 
28 Ibid., 2. 
29 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Summary of RGGI Model Rule Changes, 1. 
30 Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule.	  
31 The EPA and many other organizations contract the modeling work to ICF International, a consulting and technology 
firm that operates the Integrated Planning Model (IPM) to model the nation-wide power market subject to various 
constraints and solve for the least-cost means of meeting electrical generation and capacity requirements. 
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Pennsylvania’s choices: joining RGGI, becoming a founding member of a comparable program with 
different states, or complying as an individual state. 
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Comparing Compliance Options 
 Pennsylvania’s compliance options for the Clean Power Plan are limitless, as the proposed 
legislation allows states to meet their prescribed goals in virtually any way. Possible economies of 
scale suggest the commonwealth would benefit significantly from complying as a member of a group 
of states, as opposed to doing so alone, as the group of states can achieve savings by reducing 
emissions in the least expensive way across multiple states. The group of states however, can vary. 
Two potential groups are an expanded RGGI group, now including Pennsylvania, and the group of 
states that the EPA used in its calculations associated with the Clean Power Plan. This latter group is 
called the East Central Region, and it comprises Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland, Virginia, West 
Virginia, Delaware, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia.32 For the purposes of this analysis, I 
have considered a scenario in which Pennsylvania joins RGGI, and in so doing creates a “RGGI + 
PA” group that has no additions other than Pennsylvania, as well as one in which Pennsylvania 
forms a compliance group with the East Central region, excepting Delaware and Maryland, both of 
which are party to RGGI. Thus, the two regions are as follows. 
• RGGI + PA – Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont 
• East Central – Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, New Jersey, and Virginia 
 The draft proposal of the Clean Power Plan is a rate-based program, meaning that states are 
assigned an emission intensity that must be met by their existing fleet of generators, in terms of 
pounds of carbon dioxide emitted per megawatt-hour electricity generated. The rule allows a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The EPA chose groups for regional compliance scenarios on the basis of North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) regions, as well as Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO). NERC regions and RTOs do not 
always perfectly align with state borders, and so the EPA put states belonging to more than one organization into a 
single region for the purposes of regional compliance scenarios and renewable generation target calculation. Please see 
the EPA Regulatory Impact Analysis, 3-11, for more information on these groups. Pennsylvania’s region is based the 
PJM RTO and the RF NERC region. It includes Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, 
and Virginia. 
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conversion of this emissions rate into a tonnage-based emissions cap.33 The EPA has since released 
a technical support document that calculates the mass-based emissions cap proposed for each state, 
in terms of tons of carbon dioxide.34 The tonnage cap is used in this analysis, because a cap-and-
trade program functions on a tonnage basis, and this analysis considers the cap of a group of states 
complying together to be simply the sum of the individual caps of the states involved. The caps for 
the RGGI + PA and East Central regions are summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 1. State and regional caps for RGGI+PA and East Central regions.  
 As discussed earlier, it is difficult to arrive at a reasonable proxy for the full costs to a state in 
choosing a particular compliance strategy to respond to the Clean Power Plan. One that may help 
policymakers approach the problem most easily, though, is the size of the reduction required of each 
state. Despite the caps being set by the EPA, the reduction a state will need to make from its 2012 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Environmental Protection Agency, TSD: State Plan Considerations, 5-12. 
34 Environmental Protection Agency, TSD: Translation of the Clean Power Plan Emission Rate-­‐‑ Based CO2 Goals to Mass-­‐‑Based 
Equivalents.	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emissions to its 2029 emissions will not be the same under all compliance strategies. Forming a 
group for compliance purposes allows states to “subsidize” one another’s compliance and allow 
some states to actually have a lessened reduction. While the particulars of that reduction, in terms of 
plant closures, fuel switching, demand reductions, renewable generation build-up, and others are 
unknown and can have different costs; it seems reasonable to suggest that a lower reduction, from 
2012 to 2029 emissions, for a state implies a lower cost of compliance. It is assumed that a lesser 
reduction will be less costly. Thus, the primary methodology will be to compare reduction sizes 
between compliance strategies. 
 Comparing compliance strategies by emission reduction amounts involves forming groups 
of states under certain conditions, modeling a reduction plan, and then determining the reduction in 
an individual state. An assumption throughout is that states have a set proportion of the regional cap 
allotted to them, which is the same both before and after the reduction takes place. As an example, 
if States A, B, and C formed a group, and State B represented forty-five percent of emissions in the 
base year, when the cap reduced emissions over the course of two decades, State B’s reduction could 
be found by subtracting its base year emissions from forty-five percent of the cap in the final 
program year. This assumption could of course be incorrect should a program design choose to 
allocate differing percentages of the ending cap to states than they originally contributed in base year 
emissions, but the analysis would still be the same in such a case, using given percentages instead. 
This paper uses all constant cap percentages for simplicity of analysis. 
 In the East Central region analysis, determining a cap is relatively straightforward. Since the 
group does not exist, it is simple to choose a cap as the one the states are required to reach under 
the Clean Power Plan, to use a base year of 2012 as supplied by the Clean Power Plan, and then to 
consider different paths for reduction in the intervening years. This is somewhat more challenging 
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when considering the RGGI + PA group. RGGI formed its initial cap by considering a dataset of 
past emissions and using an adjusted figure for each member state, based on the average of the 
emissions during the three years of highest emissions between 2000-2004.3536 In the Program Review 
undertaken by RGGI in 2012, the organization decided to revise its cap downward, in order to 
compensate for emissions reductions higher than expected.37 This adjustment represented 
approximately a forty-five percent reduction in the RGGI cap. Given the significant reductions in 
RGGI emissions and the consequent downward adjustment in the regional cap, determining a cap 
for a carbon-intensive new entrant like Pennsylvania would be difficult.  
 In this analysis, I consider four different scenarios for Pennsylvania’s entry into RGGI, 
which offer varying amounts of recalculation for the current member states, and therefore have very 
different beginning cap figures and corresponding paths to reaching the Clean Power Plan’s 
proposed goals. Of course there are nearly infinite possibilities for Pennsylvania’s entry into RGGI, 
and this selection is only meant to consider a brief menu of reasonable options for the purposes of 
comparison between each other, and between the RGGI + PA, the East Central, and Pennsylvania-
alone compliance strategies. Results from modeling four RGGI scenarios and three East Central 
scenarios for Pennsylvania are summarized in the table below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Revised Staff Working Group Package Proposal. 1. 
36 RGGI’s Revised Staff Working Group Package Proposal also reports, “In developing state emissions budgets, consideration 
was given to the following factors: 2000-2004 emissions, electricity consumption, population, potential emissions 
leakage, and provision for new sources.” This analysis simplified the process, considering only 2000-2004 emissions. 
Each calculation was an approximation of RGGI’s own calculation, using different data, and so is a source of error. This 
analysis operated under the assumption that adding additional considerations, without the benefit of a detailed RGGI 
description of their use, would increase error more than it would improve precision of the analysis’ estimate. 
37 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. RGGI 2012 Program Review: Summary of Recommendations to Accompany Model Rule 
Amendments. 1.	  
	   15	  
 
Table 2. Summary of Pennsylvania Emission Changes After Seven Compliance Scenarios. 
 The results of this suggest that the least expensive compliance options would be Scenarios 5, 
6, and 7. All of these scenarios are ones in which Pennsylvania forms its own East Central group, 
rather than joining RGGI. All of these take the 2012 carbon dioxide emissions of New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia as a baseline and then reduces emissions at a similar rate 
that RGGI does, at around 2.5% per year. In RGGI, reductions are currently scheduled to happen 
each year, 2015-2020. Scenarios 6 and 7 illustrate two different East Central options, beginning the 
reductions immediately in 2017. These suggest that an East Central compliance group may be a 
lower cost option for Pennsylvania, relative to RGGI. The difference is not insignificant, either, as 
the least expensive RGGI compliance option, Scenario 2, has about 5.7 million tons more of a 
reduction in emissions than the most expensive East Central option. This difference is roughly equal 
to the emissions of one coal-fired unit in Pennsylvania.38 
 Many questions remain regarding RGGI + PA that will need to be addressed by talks 
between Pennsylvania, RGGI, and the latter group’s constituent states. This paper sought to create 
different scenarios given what is known about how RGGI formed its original caps. RGGI’s process 
can be summed up in three steps: (1) RGGI formed its own data set of emissions from the 
qualifying sources for many years in the past, then (2) used the average of the annual emissions from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Environmental Protection Agency. Data File: 2012 Unit-Level Data Using the eGRID Methodology. Note that this figure 
looks at coal units, not entire plants. Large coal-fired power plants may include three individual units. 
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the three highest years 2000-2004 for each state’s base emissions cap, and finally (3) adjusted the 
overall cap downwards roughly forty-five percent to account for emissions reductions being greater 
than expected between RGGI’s inception and 2012.39  
 Accordingly, this general framework was used. For example, emissions data is calculated 
using generation data by source and emissions factors from the Energy Information Agency. From 
this was calculated an average emissions figure for Pennsylvania’s three highest annual emissions 
from the period 2000-2004. The scenarios are then constructed to test the effects of different 
choices around this process. Scenario 1 combines Pennsylvania’s average emissions figure with the 
other RGGI states, and then adjusts this cap down by 45% in an attempt to replicate RGGI’s 
process as closely as possible (including the 2012 Program Review adjustment). Scenario 2 
recognizes the argument that the 2012 Program Review was based on the RGGI states specifically, 
and may not be applicable to Pennsylvania, and so adds the adjusted RGGI cap to the unadjusted 
Pennsylvania average emissions figure. Scenario 3 examines a situation in which RGGI and 
Pennsylvania agree to re-calculate the cap entirely and use the 2012 emissions that the EPA provides 
as a beginning cap, in order to streamline compliance with the Clean Power Plan. Finally, scenario 4 
is a hybrid approach, taking the current RGGI cap figure and adding Pennsylvania’s 2012 EPA-
provided emissions to form its initial cap. There is great difference between the caps that result from 
these differences in calculation, and it is my contention that this calculation ought to be the heart of 
discussion and negotiation between Pennsylvania and the RGGI states as the former makes its 
decision about compliance with the Clean Power Plan. 
 Joining RGGI is an attractive prospect for Pennsylvania’s, perhaps most saliently because 
the program is already running and has been for some years, and therefore it can expected that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. RGGI 2012 Program Review: Summary of Recommendations to Accompany Model Rule 
Amendments. 1. 
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administrative costs of getting the program up-and-running in Pennsylvania may be lower and 
implementation may be smoother than creating an entirely new group. There are also potential 
political advantages to joining RGGI for the Pennsylvania governor and legislature, which may seek 
to publicly join many northeastern states and thereby signal agreement with certain values and 
approaches to issues. RGGI also stands to gain from the potential union. Its stated goal is to grow 
the regional organization.40 Furthermore, Pennsylvania has such a high cap figure, due to its high 
previous generation, that the state would at least partially “subsidize” compliance in other states by 
increasing the regional cap that would need to be hit for compliance with the Clean Power Plan and 
presumably make reductions that would not need to be made in current RGGI states as a result. 
Furthermore, Pennsylvania’s entrance into RGGI could be pivotal to the expansion of the 
organization. New Jersey is an illustrative example as to why. New Jersey is an original signatory of 
RGGI, but withdrew almost immediately, citing the issue of electricity imports, specifically from 
Pennsylvania.41 These meant that New Jersey paid the costs associated with RGGI without really 
improving emissions, as generators in the state simply became less competitive relative to those 
outside. It is true that Pennsylvania is a major electricity exporter, and so its joining RGGI may 
reduce the “emissions leakage” problem that could grow if RGGI continued to add more states.42 
Thus, it might be in RGGI’s interest to persuade Pennsylvania to join as its compliance strategy. 
While Pennsylvania would likely see streamlined compliance as a result, the lessons of RGGI could 
be applied to making an East Central compliance group as well, thereby reducing the relative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding, 8. 
41 Christie, New Jersey’s Future is Green.	  
42 Emissions leakage refers to a problem specific to regional emissions reductions programs. Electrical transmission grids 
do not conform to state borders as regional emissions reductions programs like RGGI do. As a market-based program 
seeks to raise the cost of production for units emitting pollutants, the cost of production for a unit outside the 
compliance region and not subject to the emissions cost is consequently relatively lower. Therefore, there is potential for 
“emissions leakage,” whereby units inside the compliance region run less, electrical demand is met by generation outside 
the compliance region, and instead of being reduced, emissions “leak” out the region, and are simply emitted outside the 
regulatory borders. In the New Jersey example, there is potential for New Jersey power plants to simply run less and 
New Jersey to import electricity from Pennsylvania, where there was no emissions cost, and so emissions aren’t reduced, 
but simply emitted in Pennsylvania instead of New Jersey. 
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attractiveness of RGGI somewhat. The important consideration for Pennsylvania must be whether 
joining RGGI can be handled in such a way as to benefit the commonwealth, relative to 
spearheading an East Central compliance initiative. 
 As has been shown, the negotiation over the cap calculation for Pennsylvania is not simple. 
Upon a first glance, it seems that RGGI would mean more of a reduction, and thus costlier 
compliance, for Pennsylvania, relative to forming a different compliance group. Also vital to these 
discussions is the fact that Pennsylvania’s reduction alone is just over thirty-six million tons in the 
proposed regulation.4344 No RGGI+PA compliance scenario examined in this paper was less 
expensive than this figure, which means that Pennsylvania would be subsidizing the RGGI states, 
taking on a higher compliance burden in order to reduce theirs. Pennsylvania joining RGGI makes 
sense, then, only on the assumption that some “grand bargain” is reached between the two parties, 
such that the calculation of the RGGI + PA cap does not impose too arduous a burden upon 
Pennsylvania,45 and the new entrant received some other benefit. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Environmental Protection Agency. Rate to Mass Translation Data File. 
44 Ibid. PA 2012 Emissions: 105,184 thousand metric tons = 115,945,375.04 tons; PA Emissions Goal: 72,272.31 
thousand metric tons = 79,666,489.85; Difference: 28,181,657.46 metric tons. Thousand Metric tons = 1,102.31 short 
tons. PA Reduction = 36,278,885.19 tons.	  
45 It is likely that any calculation would result in some burden being placed on Pennsylvania, meaning that joining RGGI 
would entail a larger reduction, and thus cost, than would compliance as an individual state. 
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East Central Regional Compliance Modeled Outcomes 
In considering the impact of a potential East Central compliance region, the EPA does provide 
some advantages. In its modeling work, the EPA considers both a state and a regional approach.46 
The regional approach uses what the EPA considers to be the East Central region, with is the same 
as this analysis’ assumption, with the exception of the states in the RGGI compliance group 
already.47 The modeling outputs are certainly inclusive of a degree of error because of the inclusion 
of states already in RGGI: Delaware and Maryland, as well as Washington, D.C., which was not 
included in this analysis.48 However, the study of these modeling outputs are nonetheless an 
important consideration, as the Integrated Planning Model linear programming model is powerful 
tool for modeling an entire power market, and thus can provide unique insight that cannot be 
otherwise attained. Most usefully, the model takes into account the constraints of the Clean Power 
Plan regulation as well as other regulation, and then solves for regional compliance allowing for 
changes in existing assets’ generation, new assets to be built and run, energy efficiency measures, and 
so on to provide a detailed compliance scenario.49 Figures 2 and 3 below show the changes over time 
of modeled generation by fuel type in the East Central region and in Pennsylvania. The East Central 
region shown here is that of this analysis, and removes Delaware, Maryland, and the District of 
Columbia.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Analysis of the Proposed Clean Power Plan: IPM Run Files.  
47 Environmental Protection Agency, Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, 4-15. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Environmental Protection Agency, Documentation for v.5.13, 2-1 – 2-13.	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Figure 2. East Central region modeled generation mix by fuel type.50 
 
Figure 3. Pennsylvania modeled generation mix by fuel type.51 
 The above figures have several salient features. First, nuclear power is completely phased out 
of the generation mix for the 2050 model year, both in the region and in Pennsylvania, after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Data source: Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Analysis of the Proposed Clean Power Plan: IPM Run Files, Option 1 
– Regional, RPE file. 
51 Ibid.	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experiencing a significant decline in the 2040 model year. Note that both 2040 and 2050 model years 
are intended to represent a ten-year period. This is unsurprising in the sense that current nuclear 
plants would likely age and retire by that timeframe, but it is illuminating to see that the model does 
not have new nuclear generation built. Secondly, coal generation does not decline as precipitously as 
might be expected. In Pennsylvania, 2050 generation is just under sixty-one thousand Gigawatt-
hours (GWh), which is only a 22.5% decline from seventy thousand five hundred GWh generated in 
2016 in this scenario. Similarly, in the region as a whole, coal generation only dips 11% between 
2016 and 2050. Finally, it is insightful to see a major difference between Pennsylvania and the region 
as a whole. While the built-up of natural gas generation in Pennsylvania is modest, peaking in 2020 
at 13.9% above 2016, it is enormous in the overall region, with a 2050 peak 278% higher than 2016. 
This is the manifestation of the fact that Pennsylvania’s generation overall declines over time, at a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR)52 of -1.51%, whereas the region over experiences generation 
growing at a CAGR of 0.70%. The takeaway is that Pennsylvania generation declines significantly in 
order to comply with the Clean Power Plan and the vast majority of that decline can be attributed to 
the decline in nuclear generation, whereas regional generation grows and growth in natural gas-fired 
generation accounts for even more than this increase (as it replaces the lost nuclear generation as 
well).  
 This modeling result does have some error. Most prominently, the above figures are based 
on the exclusion of Delaware, Maryland, and the District of Columbia (DC), which were used by the 
model in calculating the result above. However, when considering the modeled generation mix of 
the region including Maryland, Delaware, and DC, the results do not differ significantly. Overall 
generation increases with a CAGR of 0.57%, nuclear generation is nearly zero by 2050, and natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) is calculated as: CAGR =	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!
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gas-fired generation increases 236% between 2016 and 2050, replacing the nuclear generation as well 
as fueling growth in generation. Since the profile is so similar to the scenario without the two RGGI 
states and DC, it seems reasonable to use the data to consider just this analysis’ proposed East 
Central region. The generation mix by fuel type is summarized in Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4. East Central region generation mix by fuel type including Delaware, Maryland, and DC.53 
 Overall, EPA’s IPM modeling outputs allow for an instructive examination of how 
generation types would change under a regional compliance scenario of an East Central region. In 
short, the region would continue to see generation growth through 2050, and it would be fueled by a 
sustained and massive increase in natural gas-fired generation. Pennsylvania, however, would see its 
overall generation rapidly fall with a CAGR of -1.51%, as nuclear generation would cease over time 
coal generation would decrease by 22% and natural gas generation would increase by 13.9%, both 
between 2016 and 2050. With respect to the Clean Power Plan, compliance for Pennsylvania seems 
to be driven primarily by energy efficiency and demand reduction measures, along with modest fuel-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Data source: Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Analysis of the Proposed Clean Power Plan: IPM Run Files, Option 1 
– Regional, RPE file. 
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switching measures. In the East Central region more broadly, fuel shifting seems to play a much 
larger role. New-built renewable sources of energy are a significant means of compliance in neither 
Pennsylvania nor the broader region. 
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Additional Considerations 
 One important consideration when evaluating a regional compliance program is the 
“revenue circle,” meaning the way in which money leaves generators in the state, goes into a regional 
auction pool, is distributed back to states, and then reinvested in those states. A critical question is 
how the revenues are allocated back to states following a regional auction. In the RGGI 
marketplace, states are allocated a state cap of allowances, and can then decide to sell a portion of 
those allowances at the regional auction, to sell a portion at a fixed price, or distribute some in a 
different manner. Table 3 shows the distribution of allowances by the original RGGI states, and 
Table 4 shows their respective auction revenues. 
 
Table 3. Original RGGI states’ allowance budgets and distribution decisions.54 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Data source: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Investment of Proceeds from RGGI CO2 Allowances, 3. 
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Table 4. Original RGGI states’ allowance auction proceeds.55 
 These represent only the revenues from RGGI auctions through 2010, and are in excess of 
three-quarters of a billion dollars, thus the importance of revenue distribution. As is shown in these 
charts, RGGI auction revenues are distributed simply, as the auction price is multiplied by the by the 
number of allowances in that state’s allowance budget, or in other words, each state gets to sell their 
allowance budget and receive the revenues of that sale. It should be noted that this means that 
auction revenues, being distributed on the basis of the budget, are not allocated the basis of where 
the emissions were actually emitted. This seems relatively reasonable, given the nature of CO2 
emissions’ global impact – the program revenues are for furthering the program of reducing these 
emissions, not for direct cleanup.  
 The revenues, then, can be reinvested into the state itself, such that the “revenue circle” is 
closed inside of Pennsylvania – money is not significantly flowing out of the state as a result. It 
could be plausibly argued that it is still possible for money to flow out of the state if Pennsylvania 
generators purchase the allowances disproportionately, such that the state’s generators ended up 
buying other states’ allowances in large amounts. This would have to be quite a significant effect in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Ibid., 4. 
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order to genuinely flip the balance of economic effect, however. Studies have already analyzed the 
effects of RGGI on the states currently in the program, and have found them to be positive, 
meaning that more economic benefits were attained than the value of the allowances themselves, or 
that the money taken from generators when they purchased allowances earned more when 
reinvested by the states.56 Thus even if there were to be some outflow of revenue proceeds, that 
outflow would need to outweigh the economic benefits of the reinvested proceeds of auctioning the 
state’s allowance budget, which does not seem likely. 
 States achieve these economic benefits by investing auction proceeds in a variety of 
programs aimed at curbing greenhouse emissions and improving local economies. Overall, the 
proceeds of the early RGGI program (for which good data exists) were split up such that about half 
were invested in energy efficiency (52%), a quarter in renewable energy generation and direct energy 
bill payment assistance (25%), with the remainder being put towards budget deficit repayment in 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New York, and all states proportionately contributing to program 
administration.57 Energy efficiency comprises numerous different types of programs by different 
states, such as home and small business weatherization and retrofits, energy efficient appliance 
programs, educational programs, large-scale commercial and industrial projects including combined 
heat and power projects, municipal clean energy programs, and energy efficiency job training 
programs.58 These different programs ensure that revenues within a state are going to numerous 
constituencies, from large companies in utility-administered projects to small businesses and 
individual consumers. RGGI auction proceeds within a state do provide positive economic benefits, 
and those benefits are broadly distributed throughout the economy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Hibbard and Tierney, Carbon Control and the Economy: Economic Impacts of RGGI’s First Three Years, Figure 1. 
57 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Investment of Proceeds from RGGI CO2 Allowances, 12. 
58 Ibid., 14-22.	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 A final point of additional consideration is just how Pennsylvania, or any state, could comply 
with the Clean Power Plan alone. For the purposes of comparing compliance options, this analysis 
assumed a simple cap-and-trade within the state, but that is not the only option. A state could also 
return to an integrated resource planning approach. This would entail the state requiring all actors 
involved to submit plans for various emissions improvements, likely following the broad outlines of 
the EPA building blocks of the Clean Power Plan, and the state would then build a supply curve of 
actors’ plans, and implement the least expensive ones in order until the requirements were met. In 
effect, this would mean distribution companies would need to build supply curves of energy 
efficiency and demand reduction measures they could provide at different price points, coal plant 
operators creating a curve for heat rate improvements, a commissioned study into the curve for 
incentivizing renewables construction, and so on. This would be complicated by Pennsylvania’s 
position within PJM, a competitive power market, that would make it difficult to find a way to re-
dispatch generation from coal plants to natural gas combined-cycle plants, in accordance with the 
EPA’s Clean Power Plan building block 2. Nonetheless, such a program would likely be able to 
work out the difficulties associated with it. The importance of understanding such an approach’s 
complexity, though, is to make it clear that while joining a regional program would have 
administrative difficulties associated with it as a result of the program and the marshaling of 
different states, individual compliance would also be fraught with complexity. 
 The additional considerations discussed above serve to reinforce the conclusions from 
earlier in the analysis. There are additional costs and difficulties that help to make regional 
compliance attractive for Pennsylvania. The closed “revenue circle” should assuage fears over a 
capital outflow to other states in such a scenario. However, these thoughts, in particular the notion 
of economic benefits exceeding the value of allowances auctioned off, ought also to question the 
means by which different options are considered. It is possible that a larger reduction, the proxy for 
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cost in this analysis, to be preferable to Pennsylvania, as that reduction could be equal to funds 
reinvested and creating additional economic value for the state. It is beyond the scope of this 
analysis to determine whether the economic impact of reinvested auction proceeds outweighs the 
cost of having to reduce emissions further and administer a larger change in the state’s electrical 
power markets, but it appear a fruitful avenue for further research. For the present, it seems clear 
that Pennsylvania ought to seriously attempt regional compliance with the Clean Power Plan 
regulation, and that an “East Central” compliance region is worth consideration as a compliance 
strategy. 
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Conclusion 
 Pennsylvania’s choice of compliance method for the Clean Power Plan could have enormous 
repercussions for the state and its economy, not only through the program’s end date of 2030, but 
into the future. By taking size of required reduction in emissions as a proxy for the burden of the 
regulation, the relatively simple modeling in this analysis shows that Pennsylvania stands to gain 
from forming an East Central compliance region, and stands to lose from joining RGGI. The 
comparison of the two is done relative to simply complying as an individual state. This may not be 
the ideal baseline, however, as it assumes the state will put in place a cap-and-trade program of its 
own. As an electricity exporter, this might not be in Pennsylvania’s interest, as it could lead to 
Pennsylvania electricity being disadvantaged in the regional PJM marketplace, relative to generators 
in states without such a program. Instead, Pennsylvania might choose an integrated resource 
planning approach, or another approach entirely, but the burden of such a compliance method is 
unknown, especially without the benefit of an advanced linear programming model to test additional 
hypothesized compliance schemes. The results of the IPM model runs, an example of an advanced 
linear programming model, released by the EPA showed that the burden of regulation for 
Pennsylvania in an East Central compliance region was less than feared.  
 Even if the state complying as an individual cap-and-trade program is an unrealistic baseline, 
the cap-and-trade programs of the East Central region and RGGI are entirely reasonable to compare 
directly, and in all scenarios modeled in this analysis, the East Central region imposes a lessened 
burden upon Pennsylvania than joining RGGI. It seems likely that this is due to the composition of 
generation in the two regions. RGGI has less generation overall, and less coal-fired generation, thus 
Pennsylvania’s generators work out to be the marginal emitters in such a union.59 In contrast, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The concept of marginal emitters is relevant in a cap-and-trade compliance scenario. In such a scenario, the price of 
allowances is set by the cost of the marginal reduction in emissions at a source. If all such marginal sources are in 
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East Central region comprises states more akin to Pennsylvania from a generation mix standpoint. 
For this reason, the marginal emitters are not as likely to be exclusively in Pennsylvania, and thus the 
burden of compliance is shared more equitably amongst the states therein. From this point, this 
analysis concludes that it is in the interest of Pennsylvania to pursue the East Central region, or a 
similar region, for compliance with the Clean Power Plan, in order to meet the regulation with the 
least burden upon Pennsylvania’s economy. The analysis stops short of specifically modeling a unit-
by-unit effect of the two regions, as well as short of an economy-wide, and not just electrical power 
market, standpoint. These are likely to be fruitful avenues for future research, not least because of 
the closed “revenue circle” mentioned above, as concerns the possible positive return to investment 
of cap-and-trade auction revenues. In short, this analysis began at there being no coherent basis in 
the debate as to whether Pennsylvania should join RGGI. It ends not with a hypothesized answer, 
but more importantly with a reasonable basis of comparison somewhat explored. The door is very 
open for the fine-tuning of the analysis and expensive modeling, as this debate is not one that ought 
to be answered lightly. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pennsylvania, then reductions will occur in Pennsylvania (and not other states), thereby increasing its burden under the 
regulation. 
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Appendix I – Compliance Scenarios 
Scenario 1. Cap Basis: Average of 3 Highest Years 2000-’04 with a 45% Adjustment 
 
 
This scenario uses the RGGI states as well as Pennsylvania. It attempts to calculate Pennsylvania’s 
cap using the same calculation as was used to calculate the other RGGI states’ originally, i.e. the 
average of the emissions in the three years with highest emissions between 2000 and 2004. This 
calculation also adjusts Pennsylvania’s calculated cap downwards by 45%, in keeping with the 45% 
reduction to the RGGI cap after the 2012 Program Review. This scenario calculation includes a 
lower version (Pennsylvania has a 50% reduction from base average 2000-2004 emissions, other 
states have 45%) and a higher version (Pennsylvania has a 20% reduction from base emissions, other 
states have 45%) for illustrative purposes of the options facing negotiators. The calculation of 
Pennsylvania’s total change is based upon the base cap. Note that in compliance scenarios 1-4, 
reductions begin in 2015, adding to the total compliance period before 2029, and are based on the 
idea that joining RGGI would allow a streamlined adoption of emissions reductions in Pennsylvania, 
and therefore Pennsylvania would begin reducing emissions in 2015, when RGGI is already 
scheduled to do so.60 This is a conservative estimate, as PA would likely need more time to begin.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI 2012 Program Review: Summary of Recommendations to Accompany Model Rule 
Amendments, 2. 
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Scenario 2. Cap Basis: PR2012 + PA Average of 3 Highest Years 2000-’04 (no PA adjustment) 
 
 
This scenario uses the RGGI-determined cap following its 2012 Program Review: 91 million short 
tons.61 It adds to that Pennsylvania’s average annual emissions for the three highest years 2000-2004, 
attempting to replicate Pennsylvania joining RGGI with an original cap similar to how the RGGI 
original caps were calculated, and without the Program Review 2012 reduction, which Pennsylvania’s 
emissions were not included in. It then makes 3.5% per year reductions, 2015-2029.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI 2012 Program Review: Summary of Recommendations to Accompany Model Rule 
Amendments, 2. 
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Scenario 3. Cap Basis: RGGI + PA 2012 Emissions 
 
 
This scenario assumes that RGGI and Pennsylvania decide to revamp the calculation of their cap in 
order to more easily comply with the 111(d) regulations. The cap uses the 2012 emissions given by 
the EPA as the original cap.62 It then makes reductions of 3% per year, 2015-2029.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Environmental Protection Agency, Rate to Mass Translation Data File.  
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Scenario 4. RGGI 2014 Cap + PA 2012 Emissions 
 
 
Scenario 4 assumes that RGGI and Pennsylvania decide to use the Program Review 2012 
determined 2014 RGGI cap of 91 million tons,63 and add Pennsylvania’s 2012 emissions, as reported 
by the EPA in the Clean Power Plan technical support documents.64 It adds the two for an original 
cap, and then reduces the cap by 3% per year, 2015-2029.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI 2012 Program Review: Summary of Recommendations to Accompany 
Model Rule Amendments, 2. 
64 Environmental Protection Agency, Rate to Mass Translation Data File.	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Scenario 5. Cap Basis: 2012 Emissions, 2.5% Reduction Per Year Beginning 2018. 
 
 
This cap scenario is the first of the East Central region calculations. It uses the region the EPA used 
to calculate renewable generation targets for Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, 
Ohio, Washington, D.C., Delaware, Virginia, and West Virginia. It removes those states that belong 
to RGGI, as well as Washington, D.C., and so comprises Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Virginia, 
and West Virginia. This scenario uses the 2012 EPA-calculated mass emissions, with a 2.5% 
reduction per year beginning in 2018. 
  
	   36	  
Scenario 6. Cap Basis: 2012 Emissions, 2.5% Reduction Per Year Beginning 2017. 
 
 
This cap calculation uses the EPA-calculated 2012 mass emissions of the East Central states as the 
basis for the cap. This is accompanied with a 2.5% reduction per year, which is the same as the 
RGGI annual reduction. 
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Scenario 7. Cap Basis: 2012 Emissions, 2.6% Reduction Per Year Beginning 2018. 
 
 
This cap calculation uses the EPA-calculated 2012 mass emissions of the East Central states as the 
basis for the cap, along with a 2.6% reduction per year, 0.1% above the RGGI annual reduction, 
beginning in 2018.  
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Appendix II – Calculation of Pennsylvania Average Emissions Figure 
 Calculation of Pennsylvania’s average emissions figure to use in RGGI+PA scenarios was 
based upon the methodology of RGGI’s initial calculation of state caps. Information regarding the 
specifics of the calculation used by RGGI is relatively difficult to come by. For example, the actual 
data on emissions is not available. EPA released a large amount of data on emissions in its eGRID 
database, but eGRID data is only available for 2000 and 2004, and so is not helpful for a calculation 
of the average of the three highest annual emissions, 2000-2004. Absent a reliable source of state-by-
state emissions by generation type, this analysis used Energy Information Agency state-by-state 
generation data by generation type along with standard emissions figures for various generation 
types in order to form emissions data for the years 2000-20004.65 
 The Energy Information Agency provides carbon dioxide emissions factors for electric 
utility coal in 1980 and 1992.66 These emission factors are in lbs/mmBTU, thus emissions from 
plants require heat rates as well. Table 4 summarizes the average heat rates used in this analysis. 
 
Table 5. Average heat rates by generation type, 2002-2012.67 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Generation dataset generated with the Energy Information Agency (EIA)’s Electricity Data Browser. Data is 
generated by using the pre-generated report 1.2: Net generation by energy source: electric utility, and sorting by annual 
figures with Filter/Order commands used to add a geography split, specifically New England and the Middle Atlantic. 
66 Hong and Slatick, Carbon Dioxide Emission Factors for Coal. 
67 Energy Information Agency, Electric Power Annual 2013, Table 8.1.	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This analysis used the average of the average heat rates 2002-2012, as shown in Table 4. These heat 
rates are then used to convert the lbs/mmBTU heat content-based emission factor to lbs/MWh 
generation-based emissions factor. The results for three major fossil-fuel categories are shown in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 6. Emission rates by fuel type.68 
 These emission rates were combined with the EIA net generation by energy source in the 
electric utility sector data to form annual emission amounts for Connecticut, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. The purpose of calculating emissions for 
more than just Pennsylvania in this way was to compare the calculated results of the other states to 
the calculated figures from RGGI in order to provide some degree of validation to the estimate. 
Results are provided in Table 6. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Combines figures from Hong and Slatick, Carbon Dioxide Emission Factors for Coal and Energy Information Agency, 
Electric Power Annual 2013, from the latter both Table 8.1 “Average operating heat rate for selected energy sources” and 
Table A.3 “Carbon dioxide uncontrolled emission factors.” 
	   40	  
 
Table 7. Calculated emissions based on generation. 
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 Average values from the three highest annual emissions for these states are summarized in 
Table 7, along with the percent different of that estimate from the RGGI figure where appropriate, 
Pennsylvania does not have such a figure as RGGI has not calculated a figure for that state’s cap. 
 
Table 8. Calculated caps with differences from RGGI calculations.  
As Table 7 showed, differences were often significant from RGGI calculations. These differences 
come from a variety of sources, such as different data sets, emissions factors, and adjustments to cap 
figures made by RGGI after calculating one from the average emissions. There is a correlation of     
-0.61 between the size of the calculated cap and the absolute value of the percent difference from 
the RGGI cap, meaning that larger calculated caps tend to be somewhat more like RGGI’s 
calculations. This adds to the theory that larger caps, like Pennsylvania, would be less adjusted by 
RGGI, and therefore Pennsylvania’s calculated cap is reasonable for the purposes of this analysis. 
This Pennsylvania figure, the average of calculated emissions for the three highest years 2000-2004, 
is used in scenarios 1 and 2. 
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Appendix III – Output and Methodology of EPA IPM Modeling Results 
 The EPA’s results from modeling the proposed Clean Power Plan in IPM were released 
alongside the proposed regulation in June 2014.69 There are output files for numerous scenarios, 
both regional and state-by-state, and within each scenario are numerous output files with extensive 
data.70 The analysis of outputs used in this analysis centered on the Option 1 – Regional scenario, in 
which option 1 refers to the EPA’s expected version of the regulation, and regional meaning 
compliance by states in groups, as opposed to individually. In particular, data was taken from the 
RPE file, which is the file of plant-by-plant outputs including generation, emissions, capacity, fuel 
type, and so on.71  
 In order to hone in on the region in question, this analysis sorted the data by model region 
and then on a plant-by-plant basis for states, since the regions cross state borders. The model 
regions are shown on the cover of the documentation, and by filtering based on the regions that at 
least partially overlap a state in the region in question, all plants in the region in question will be 
included in the sorted data. The “Unit Long Name” column of the data is used to make the search 
finer, as units’ long names include the abbreviation of the name of the state in which they are 
located.72 To locate all plants in Pennsylvania, for example, the regions PJM_AP, PJM_ATSI, 
PJM_EMAC, PJM_PENE, and PJM_WMAC are further sorted by all unit long names including 
‘PA’ somewhere in their name. By sorting by fuel type and adding generation figures, the following 
charts were made summarizing data on generation amounts by fuel type over the time period 
covered by the IPM runs, 2016-2050. The three charts cover this data for Pennsylvania, the East 
Central region as proposed by this analysis (with RGGI states and the District of Columbia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69  
70 Guide to outputs 
71 Ibid., 1. 
72 Cite data directly	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removed), as well as the EPA’s proposed East Central region, which includes Delaware, Maryland, 
and Washington, D.C. The two former states are already a part of RGGI, and the latter much 
smaller than the remaining states, and so this analysis did not consider them a part of a viable 
compliance group.  
 As mentioned in the section interpreting this data, the model solves for compliance over the 
entire region including Delaware, Maryland, and D.C., and so the results discounting them have to 
be read with the understanding that there is error inherent in that they were included in the 
calculation of the outputs, but are not presented as part of the outputs in this analysis, except where 
noted. However, and as mentioned in the section interpreting the results, there is not a significant 
difference in the region with and without these three areas, in terms of broad trends. Thus, the 
modeled outputs, though not modeled on the exact basis of this paper’s proposed East Central 
region, are still quite useful in showing the possible least-cost means of compliance for the group 
and state, and serve as a strong basis for understanding the options facing policymakers as they 
consider this and other regional compliance scenarios. 
 
Table 9. Summary of Pennsylvania modeled generation by fuel type. 
 
Table 10. Summary of East Central regional generation excluding RGGI states and D.C. 
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Table 11. Summary of East Central regional generation including RGGI states and D.C.  
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